The phenomenological calculus is a relational paradigm for complex systems, closely related in substance and spirit to Robert Rosen’s own approach. Its mathematical language is multilinear algebra. The epistemological exploration continues in this paper, with the expansion of the phenomenological calculus into the realm of anisotropy.

In this paper I argue that the program of L. Laudan et al for empirically testing historiographical philosophies of science ("the VPI program") does not succeed in providing a consistent naturalist program in philosophy of science. In particular, the VPI program endorses a nonnaturalist metamethodology that insists on a hypothetico-deductive structure to scientific testing. But hypothetico-deductivism seems to be both inadequate as an account of scientific theory testing in general and fundamentally at odds with most of the historiographic philosophies under (...) test. I sketch an account of testing historiographic philosophies of science more consistent with the views about scientific testing of those philosophies and argue that such a program is neither viciously circular nor necessarily self-refuting. (shrink)

Much else was done by Rose and Sullivan in their possibly conclusive attempt to restore sense to the rebus passage, but the reading super scorpionem locustam was Gaselee's, as Rose and Sullivan clearly acknowledge. This seems unluckily to have escaped B. Baldwin, otherwise he would have noticed that Gaselee also fancied in his correction an allusion to the poisoner Locusta. For those who may have difficulty in obtaining Gaselee's collotype reproduction, I quote the relevant part: ‘But what have lobsters to (...) do with poisoners? Is it permissible to see a more or less open reference to Locusta, the queen of all poisoners? If so, we have here another little piece of evidence which will help us to date the Satyricon.’. (shrink)

Much else was done by Rose and Sullivan in their possibly conclusive attempt to restore sense to the rebus passage, but the reading super scorpionem locustam was Gaselee's, as Rose and Sullivan clearly acknowledge. This seems unluckily to have escaped B. Baldwin, otherwise he would have noticed that Gaselee also fancied in his correction an allusion to the poisoner Locusta. For those who may have difficulty in obtaining Gaselee's collotype reproduction, I quote the relevant part: ‘But what have lobsters to (...) do with poisoners? Is it permissible to see a more or less open reference to Locusta, the queen of all poisoners? If so, we have here another little piece of evidence which will help us to date the Satyricon.’. (shrink)

Mr. Norman H. Baynes thinks that the conclusions which I reached in my essay on the ‘Chronology of the Ninth Book of the Ecclesiastical History of Eusebius’ are ‘difficult to believe.’ That is due, he says, to the fact that I based my reconstruction ‘on one of the most doubtful sections of that book’—that in which Eusebius states that the Emperor Maximin wrote his letter to Sabinus after he received the ‘Edict of Milan.’ From it I inferred that the letter (...) was dispatched early in 313. No doubt Eusebius' assertion raises difficulties. But when a contemporary witness of high authority speaks it may be wise not to reject his evidence before the difficulties which seem to overthrow it are scrutinized. In the present instance the difficulties seem to me to vanish on examination. But Mr. Baynes appears to have overlooked my attempt to deal with them. His own view of the date of the letter is expressed in a single sentence ‘In November of 312 Maximin would receive news of Constantine's victory [at the Milvian Bridge], and as a result he issues the letter to Sabinus permitting Christian worship late in 312.’ But where is his evidence? All I can find is that in his edict of toleration Maximin affirms that ‘last year’ he wrote the letter. ‘This passage proves that that letter dates from the year 312.’ Yes, if Maximin's year began in January. But is that certain? In the East, New Year's Day was not uncommonly in September. (shrink)

Individuals make decisions under uncertainty every day. Decisions are based on in- complete information concerning the potential outcome or the predicted likelihood with which events occur. In addition, individuals’ choices often deviate from the rational or mathematically objective solution. Accordingly, the dynamics of human decision making are difficult to capture using conventional, linear mathematical models. Here, we present data from a 2-choice task with variable risk between sure loss and risky loss to illustrate how a simple nonlinear dynamical system can (...) be employed to capture the dynamics of human decision making under uncertainty (i.e., multistability, bifurcations). We test the feasibility of this model quantitatively and demonstrate how the model can account for up to 86% of the observed choice behavior. The implications of using dynamical models for explaining the nonlin- ear complexities of human decision making are discussed as well as the degree to which the theory of nonlinear dynamical systems might offer an alternative framework for understanding human decision making processes. (shrink)

Individuals make decisions under uncertainty every day based on incomplete information concerning the potential outcome of the choice or chance levels. The choices individuals make often deviate from the rational or mathematically objective solution. Accordingly, the dynamics of human decision-making are difficult to capture using conventional, linear mathematical models. Here, we present data from a two-choice task with variable risk between sure loss and risky loss to illustrate how a simple nonlinear dynamical system can be employed to capture the dynamics (...) of human decision-making under uncertainty (i.e., multi-stability, bifurcations). We test the feasibility of this model quantitatively and demonstrate how the model can account for up to 86% of the observed choice behavior. The implications of using dynamical models for explaining the nonlinear complexities of human decision-making are discussed, as well as the degree to which nonlinear dynamical systems theory might offer an alternative framework for understanding human decision-making processes. (shrink)

The most interesting feature about Mr. Richardson's criticism of my paper is that it reveals the typical attitude of the traditional intelligence tester which I set out to criticize. He accepts the view that intelligence deals mainly with the grasping of relationships, that intelligence thus defined is an innate ability, that it may be relatively isolated by the use of suitably designed tests and treated independently of other abilities.

In this article, I provide a new account of the basis of medical researchers' ancillary care obligations. Ancillary care in medical research, or medical care that research participants need but that is not required for the validity or safety of a study or to redress research injuries, is a topic that has drawn increasing attention in research ethics over the last ten years. My view, the relationship-based approach, improves on the main existing theory, Richardson and Belsky's ‘partial-entrustment model’, by (...) avoiding its problematic restriction on the scope of health needs for which researchers could be obligated to provide ancillary care. Instead, it grounds ancillary care obligations in a wide range of morally relevant features of the researcher-participant relationship, including the level of engagement between researchers and participants, and weighs these factors against each other. I argue that the level of engagement, that is, the duration and intensity of interactions, between researchers and participants matters for ancillary care because of its connection to the meaningfulness of a relationship, and I suggest that other morally relevant features can be grounded in researchers' role obligations. (shrink)

In this article, I provide a new account of the basis of medical researchers' ancillary care obligations. Ancillary care in medical research, or medical care that research participants need but that is not required for the validity or safety of a study or to redress research injuries, is a topic that has drawn increasing attention in research ethics over the last ten years. My view, the relationship‐based approach, improves on the main existing theory, Richardson and Belsky's ‘partial‐entrustment model’, by (...) avoiding its problematic restriction on the scope of health needs for which researchers could be obligated to provide ancillary care. Instead, it grounds ancillary care obligations in a wide range of morally relevant features of the researcher‐participant relationship, including the level of engagement between researchers and participants, and weighs these factors against each other. I argue that the level of engagement, that is, the duration and intensity of interactions, between researchers and participants matters for ancillary care because of its connection to the meaningfulness of a relationship, and I suggest that other morally relevant features can be grounded in researchers' role obligations. (shrink)

The Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget contends that children below the age of 12 see no necessity for the logical law of non-contradiction. I argue this view is problematic. First of all, Piaget's dialogues with children which are considered supportive of this position are not clearly so. Secondly, Piaget underestimates the necessary nature of following the logical law of non-contradiction in everyday discourse. The mere possibility of saying something significant and informative at all presupposes that the law of non-contradiction is enforced.

We argue that the geometry of spacetime is a convention that can be freely chosen by the scientist; no experiment can ever determine this geometry of spacetime, only the behavior of matter in space and time. General relativity is then rewritten in terms of an arbitrary conventional geometry of spacetime in which particle trajectories are determined by forces in that geometry, and the forces determined by fields produced by sources in that geometry. As an example, we consider radial trajectories in (...) the field of a single particle expressed in the spacetime of special relativity. (shrink)